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Abstract: We assemble a novel dataset to study the impact of male scarcity on marital 
assortative matching and other marriage market outcomes using the large shock that WWI 
caused to the number of French men. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that 
post war in regions with higher mortality rates: men were less likely to marry women of lower 
social classes; men were more likely and women less likely to marry; out-of-wedlock births 
increased; divorce rates decreased; and the age gap decreased. These findings are consistent with 
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1. Introduction 
Marriage market outcomes are known to have important implications for fertility, education, 
labor supply, social inequality, and income redistribution (e.g. Fernandez and Rogerson, 2001). One 
important determinant of marriage market outcomes is the sex ratio, i.e. the ratio of men to women in 
the population. In particular, a robust prediction of marriage models is that the position of men 
(women) in the marriage market improves (worsens) with a reduction in the sex ratio (e.g., Becker, 
1973, 1974 and 1980, Bloch and Ryder, 2000, Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix, 2001). In this paper, we 
investigate how male scarcity due to exceptionally high military mortality during World War I (WWI) 
changed the relative position of men and women in the French marriage market following the war. 
Specifically, we analyze how male scarcity induced by war casualties affected men and women’s 
marital status, out-of-wedlock births, and marital assortative matching by social class and by age. 
We exploit the regrettable fact that WWI, one of the deadliest conflicts in recent human history, 
produced an exogenous and unusually large shock to the number of French men. Approximately 16.5% 
of French soldiers were reported dead or missing after the war (Huber, 1931). The First World War in 
France provides a particularly useful setting to test the effect of male scarcity on marriage outcomes 
for the following reasons. First, the ratio of men aged 18 to 59 to women aged 15 to 49 decreased 
substantially as a result of the military mortality, from 1,087 men per 1,000 women in 1911 to 992 men 
per 1,000 women in 1921.
5 Second, military mortality varied substantially across regions, with the 
percentage of soldiers killed ranging from 10.5% to 20.2% (see Figure 1), largely because men served 
in regiments with others from their regions, and different regiments were sent to battles of different 
intensities. This variation generated substantial heterogeneity in sex ratios across regions, reaching 864 
men per 1,000 women in some regions, which allows us to test the impact of male scarcity on 
assortative matching and other marriage outcomes. Finally, unlike in many other wars, military 
mortality was essentially uniform across social classes, meaning that the distribution of social classes 
in the population remained largely unchanged by the war. This fact rules out the hypothesis that 
changes in marriage by social class following the war were mechanically driven by changes in the 
distribution of people across classes.  
We use a new data set that links non-public marriage-level data to French censuses of 
population and regional data on military mortality. Throughout the paper, we adopt a differences-in-
differences approach, which examines how marriage outcome patterns changed following the war (first 
difference) in regions with different levels of military mortality (second difference). We start by using 
                                                 
5 Since this war was fought in the battlefield, civilian mortality (which is more balanced across genders) was lower than in 
later major wars such as the Second World War.    2
census data to analyze the impact of male scarcity on marital status (the proportions of single, divorced 
and widowed individuals). We find that more women remained single post war in regions with higher 
mortality. This effect was especially pronounced for women under 29 years old. In regions with 10 
percentage point higher military mortality rates, the proportion of single women aged 20 to 29 
increased by 2.7 percentage points post war (relative to a pre-war average of 39.4%). In contrast, fewer 
men aged 20-29 remained single in regions with higher mortality post war. We also find that military 
mortality had a negative effect on divorce rates for young adults: the proportion of divorcés among 
men and women aged 20-39 declined post war in regions with higher mortality rates. Finally, as 
expected, we find a large increase in the proportion of widowed women (especially women aged 30-
39) in regions with higher mortality rates. We then analyze the impact of male scarcity on out-of-
wedlock births. Such births could reflect men having more partners or men being able to shift the cost 
of child rearing to single mothers. We find a higher proportion of out-of-wedlock births post war in 
regions with higher mortality. Specifically, in regions where the military mortality was 20% compared 
with regions with 10% mortality rates, the proportion of out-of-wedlock births increased by 1.5 
percentage points post war (relative to a pre-war average of 6.7% of births). 
  Next we analyze the impact of male scarcity due to war casualties on assortative matching by 
social class. From the marriage-level data, which consist of information provided on marriage 
certificates, we obtain the specific occupations of the brides, grooms, and their parents. Based on those 
occupations, we assign individuals to one of seven ordered social classes using the Historical 
International Social Class Scheme (HISCLASS) developed by van Leeuwen and Maas (2005a). This 
thorough scheme maps occupations to social classes based on several dimensions of the occupations, 
such as whether they involve supervision of others, the skill level required to perform them, whether 
they are manual, and the economic sectors into which they fall. The classes in HISCLASS were 
carefully constructed to categorize individuals according to their life chances and to reflect their social 
status. We note that while social class is correlated with income, it encompasses several other 
dimensions that are relevant for marriage. For example, an individual’s social class also depends on 
her level of skill and therefore education, and on the social status and prestige associated with her 
occupation. 
We begin by establishing that there was considerable assortative matching by social class in 
France before WWI: 44% of men married women of the same social class. We then exploit the 
exogenous regional variation in military mortality to analyze the effect of a decrease in the male 
population on assortative matching by social class. First, we use a difference-in-differences approach 
to test the hypothesis that men married up more post war in regions with higher mortality. Second, we    3
use an instrumental variable approach to test more directly the causal effect of the sex ratio on 
assortative matching by social class. Specifically, we use the regional mortality rate as an instrument 
for the regional sex ratio, which may be endogenous because of factors such as non-random migration. 
Overall, we find that the decrease in sex ratio induced by war-related mortality allowed men post war 
in regions with higher mortality to marry better than they used to pre war. Compared with regions with 
10% military mortality rates, in regions with 20% military mortality rates the probability that a given 
groom married down post war decreased by 10 percentage points (from a pre-war average of 36.1%), 
and the probability that a given groom married a low class bride post war decreased by 17 percentage 
points.  
Finally, we analyze the impact of male scarcity on the age gap between brides and grooms. We 
note that before the war men married women on average 3.8 years younger. We find that after the war, 
the age gap narrowed more in regions with higher mortality. This effect is driven mainly by an increase 
in the age at marriage of women in such regions, with brides marrying on average 10 months older 
post war in regions with 10 percentage point higher mortality. 
Overall, these findings are consistent with the idea that the sex ratio has a strong impact on 
marriage market outcomes in general and on assortative matching in particular. Our paper contributes 
to a growing literature on sex ratios and marriage markets. Starting with the seminal work of Becker 
(1973, 1974), economists have devoted considerable attention to understanding marriage markets.
6 Part 
of this effort has been to understand the impact of a change in the sex ratio on marriage outcomes such 
as marriage rates and fertility, though not on assortative matching by social class as in the present 
paper. Early examples include Cox (1940), Easterlin (1961), Guttentag and Secord (1983). A potential 
problem of these studies, mitigated to a large extent in Angrist (2002), Charles and Luoh (2010), 
Brainerd (2007), and Lafortune (2008), is that there may be reverse causality between sex ratios and 
marriage market outcomes. Our paper uses the exogenous regional variation in military mortality to 
deal with this potential reverse causality between the sex ratio and the marriage outcomes we consider.  
In addition to these articles, other work has pointed out additional adjustments in the marriage 
market induced by a change in the relative scarcity of men or women. Rao (1993), Grossbard-
Shechtman (1993), Botticini (1999), Botticini and Siow (2003) and Edlund (2000) suggest that one 
adjustment is through dowries. Becker (1974, 1981), Bergstrom (1994), Willis (1999), and Neal 
(2004), among others, suggest that a consequence of the imbalance in sex ratio is the emergence of 
polygamy, including “serial polygamy” (divorce and re-marriage) and relationships leading to out-of-
                                                 
6 For a review of the economics of marriages, see Weiss (1993).    4
wedlock births. Becker (1973, 1981), Chiappori et al. (2001) and references therein point out that a 
possible adjustment is a change in the share of the surplus generated by marriage that is appropriated 
by each spouse. In this paper, we highlight marrying up as another important adjustment, 
complementary to the ones mentioned above, when the scarcity of men increases.  
Another important issue in the empirical literature of the marriage market is the characterization 
of individuals’ preferences for spouses (e.g., Wong, 2003, Bisin et al., 2004, Choo and Siow, 2006, 
Ariely, Hitsch and Hortacsu, 2006, Belot and Francesconi, 2006, Fisman et al., 2006, Lee, 2007, 
Banerjee et al., 2010). Our finding that men marry down less in regions with lower sex ratios is 
consistent with the hypothesis that assortative matching occurs because in equilibrium individuals 
cannot marry higher-class people, although they may wish to do so (i.e., they have vertical preferences 
for social class). This finding is also consistent with horizontal preferences for social class, if the 
distribution across classes differs sufficiently between genders and individuals prefer to marry up 
rather than down when they cannot marry someone from their own class. For theories that explicitly 
model preferences for “marrying up”, see Burdett and Coles (1997) and Banerjee et al. (2010). 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the historical context surrounding 
WWI in France. In Section 3, we present the data. In Sections 4 to 7, we analyze the impact of male 
scarcity on marital status and out-of-wedlock births, and assortative matching by social class and age at 
marriage. In Section 8, we draw final conclusions. 
 
2. Historical Context 
The First World War, or the Great War, was a global military conflict that lasted from July 
1914 until November 1918 and resulted in enormous loss of life. In this section, we present a brief 
description of the war-related mortality and its implications for the marriage market in France. The 
most relevant facts for our analysis are that the draft to the French army was nearly universal, the 
number of casualties was enormous and caused a dramatic decrease in the sex ratio, military mortality 
was uniform across social classes, and women worked in similar occupations before and after the war. 
 
2.1. Mobilization and mortality during WWI in France: a global phenomenon 
During the war, France underwent universal mobilization. Over the war period, about 8 million 
Frenchmen born between 1867 and 1899 were drafted or voluntarily enrolled in the army (Huber,    5
1931).
7 To highlight the scope of this mobilization, note that 8.8 million men aged 18 to 51 were 
registered in the 1911 census, and that the overall French population in 1911 was approximately 33.2 
million. Exemptions from the draft were extremely rare. During the war, the French army reviewed all 
exempt cases and drafted a large proportion of men who were initially exempted, including those who 
had been injured early in the war.  
As a result of this general mobilization and the violence of the conflict, military casualties were 
enormous. A total of 1.397 million men, or 16.5% of the enrolled soldiers and officers, were reported 
dead or missing in action at the end of the war. Importantly, military mortality was quite homogenous 
across military ranks: about 16% of French soldiers and 19% of French officers died or were reported 
missing. Similarly, mortality across occupations seems to have been quite uniform. Table 1 presents 
the distribution of fatalities by occupation at age 20 (Panel A) and the distribution of the labor force by 
occupation from the 1906 and 1921 censuses (Panel B).
8 Although the occupation categories differ 
slightly between the two tables, the distribution of fatalities by occupation is very similar to that of 
men in the labor force.
9  
Mortality was uniform across military rank and occupation, but there was substantial 
heterogeneity in mortality rates across geographical regions and by age. In Section 3.3 we discuss this 
geographic variation in war mortality and its causes in more detail. Men born between 1892 and 1895 
were the most affected, with 27% to 29% mortality rates across France, while men born between 1883 
and 1891 experienced mortality rates from 19.2% to 24.1%. Older cohorts of men, aged 40 and above 
at the beginning of the war, suffered the lowest mortality rates (10% or less).  In addition to military 
casualties, deaths among civilians were high during the period 1914 to 1918, with the peak of mortality 
being caused by the 1918 Spanish flu epidemic. Among the civilian population, the mortality rate may 
have been higher for men than women, and the increase in mortality rate was the most striking for 
individuals aged 15 to 45. This is potentially another exogenous cause of the unbalanced sex ratio in 
the post-WWI period. Note, however, that deaths from the Spanish flu will not be reflected in our 
measure of war-related mortality. 
 
                                                 
7 About 7.8 million men were drafted and 0.2 million enrolled voluntarily. In addition, 0.5 million foreigners and men from 
the French colonies joined the French army. All the numbers presented in this subsection are taken from Huber (1931) 
unless otherwise noted. 
8 Mortality data on soldiers’ occupations when drafted are not available.  Data on occupation at age 20 were recorded 
during each individual’s military service. 
9 Beyond the numbers in Table 1, anecdotal evidence stresses that many elites and white collar workers perished during the 
conflict. Four hundred and fifty writers from the “Societe des gens de letters”, a writers’ organization, 833 former students 
of the Ecole Polytechnique and 230 from the Ecole Normale, both of which were prestigious universities, were killed 
during the conflict.    6
2.2. Marriage market in France 
The 19
th century and the beginning of the 20
th century in France were characterized by a stable 
celibacy rate of 10% to 13.5%, and a high marriage rate (Dupaquier, 1988). The average marriage rate 
of the 1908 to 1913 period (the annual number of new spouses per 10,000 inhabitants) was 158, 
putting France at a high rank among European nations. Divorce was a rare phenomenon (around 4-6% 
of marriages), both before and after the war (Segalen, 1981).  
After the onset of the war, the total annual number of marriages diminished sharply, reaching 
its lowest value in 1915 (75,200 marriages compared with 247,900 in 1913). After 1915, the marriage 
rate started to increase again, though at a slow pace, as enlisted men were regularly granted leave to 
return home to marry. By 1919, the marriage rate exceeded its 1913 value. More than 2 million 
marriages took place in the 4 years following the end of the war (Armengaud, 1965). While the 
marriage rate increased everywhere after the war, there was heterogeneity by region, with higher 
marriage rates on the Atlantic coast and in the industrial regions of Paris and Northern France (Huber, 
1931).  
Figure 2 shows the total number of first marriages for women by cohort for the period 1900 to 
1950 and highlights how the war disturbed women’s marriage patterns. For women born in 1891 to 
1895, the distribution of marriages is literally cut in half with a first part of the distribution before the 
conflict and the second part concentrated in a few years after the war. To some extent, the cohort of 
women born in 1886-1890 experienced a similar effect. For women born in 1896-1900, the distribution 
of marriages is characterized by a large and narrow peak after the war.    
In addition to the above changes in the marriage outcomes, the war had a huge impact on the 
marriage market through the gender composition of the population. While in 1911 the sex ratio was 
997 men for every 1,000 women, by 1921 it had fallen to 909 for every 1,000. If we restrict to the 
population of marriageable age (18 to 59 years old for men and 15 to 49 years old for women
10), the 
sex ratio decreased from 1,087 men per 1,000 women in 1911 to 992 men per 1,000 women in 1921, 
reaching 864 in some regions with high mortality rates.
11 If we focus on singles, widows and divorcés 
who were 30 or younger but of marriageable age, there were approximately 2 men for every 3 women. 
 
2.3. WWI and the French labor market 
  
                                                 
10 These are the age groups defined by the French census as marriageable age. 15 and 18 years old were the minimum legal 
ages for marriage for women and men respectively.   
11 Authors’ calculation from French census data.    7
We next discuss the French labor market around the war, and provide historical evidence that 
the changes in the female labor market that occurred during the war were reversed upon the end of the 
war with the return of the men to their civilian jobs. Female labor force participation increased during 
the war, but returned to its pre-war level after the war ended. Specifically, Table 1 shows that female 
labor force participation in 1911 was at 39.0% and returned to 42.6% by 1921; by 1926 it had fallen 
further to 37.2%.
12  
In the spring of 1915, the military industries started to hire women to replace the men who were 
drafted. However, most of the women hired were not new workers; between 80 and 95% of the women 
who worked in the metalworking industry during the war worked before the war in textiles, clothing or 
services. Despite their new jobs, women typically did not receive new training by their employers. 
Instead, firms invested in the mechanization of the workplace and women were typically assigned 
repetitive tasks that required only limited skills (Downs, 1995). When men returned at the end of the 
war, women were massively laid off (Downs, 1995). In addition, when the firms and factories later 
started to re-open their doors in 1919, women’s positions were limited, their wages lagged behind 
men’s and the occupations that were exclusively reserved to males before the war became again 
unavailable to women (Downs, 1995, Schweitzer, 2002). Women who were not working before the 
war returned to their homes once the war was over (Becker, 1999); most of those who used to work 
before the war returned to their old jobs (Downs, 1995). Table 1 presents the distribution of women 
across various sectors before and after the war. While some of the pre-war averages differ from the 
post-war averages, the differences are small in magnitude, which provides further evidence that there 
were no substantial changes in female occupations due to the war.  
Meanwhile, drafted men were absent from their jobs until the demobilization, which began in 
November 1918. Unlike in England, the demobilization was not organized around the professional 
activity of the drafted. Rather, it was organized by age, with older men being discharged earlier. By 
October 1919, 4.5 million men had been discharged (Huber, 1931). To ease their return to economic 
activity, the government passed a law in November 1918 stating that all administrations and public and 
private firms had to re-hire, wherever possible, the men they had employed before the war. After a 
short period of high male unemployment at the end of the war, normal economic activity picked up in 
1919 and the unemployment rate fell to 1.4% by 1921. Table 1 shows that, as in the case of women, 
                                                 
12 Female unemployment increased in 1914 due to the closure of firms and factories at the onset of the war, but decreased in 
the spring of 1915 because of the demand of the war industry. At the same time, female labor force participation increased. 
Though there was no census during the war, female labor force participation is estimated to have reached a peak of 46% 
(Down, 1995).    8
the distribution of male workers by sector did not change substantially between 1906 and 1921. In 
1921, the male labor force participation was 71.2%, only a bit higher than its 1906 level of 68.2%. 
  
3. Data 
We use data from several sources, including a non-public marriage-level data set, pre and post-
war French censuses of population, and geographical data on the number of French war casualties. 
Because most of these data are unique and have not been used before, this section presents and 
discusses them in some detail. Appendix Table A1 presents the summary statistics of the dependent 
variables used in the analyses. 
 
3.1. The TRA data set 
Our marriage-level data are from the TRA data set, which is the result of a survey, “l’enquête 
des 3,000 familles”, that collected data on the descendants of 3,000 couples who got married between 
1803 and 1832 in mainland France. This project, undertaken by the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en 
Sciences Sociales, aims at analyzing social and geographical mobility in France in the 19
th and 20
th 
centuries. Dupaquier (2004) presents in detail the sampling design and logistics of the data collection. 
We briefly summarize these below. 
The 3,000 families selected between 1803 and 1832 were representative of the French 
population at the time (one family per 10,000 inhabitants) living in mainland France. Data on birth, 
marriage and death certificates were collected. Geographical quotas were used to ensure geographical 
representativeness: the number of couples sampled per département was proportional to its population 
from the 1806 census.
13  Then, in each département, a random sample of couples was drawn among 
those whose names started with the letters “TRA,” such as Trarieux, Trabit, etc… The letters TRA 
were chosen to allow names from various local dialects to be represented in the sample, as well as to 
ensure representativeness of all the social classes (Pélissier et al., 2005). Specifically, names starting 
with the letters TRA are believed to cut across all social classes in France. Obviously there are other 
ways to randomize to ensure representativeness, but selecting TRA names is a particularly practical 
way to do so since documents in archives are typically organized by name. The descendants of the 
TRA families and their spouses were followed until 1986. To avoid exponential growth of the sample 
size over time, the descendants of women (who lost their TRA name upon marriage) are not included 
in the sample. Dupaquier (2004) points out two potential biases in the TRA data set. The aristocracy 
                                                 
13 Départements are administrative units similar to counties. In the period 1870-1914, France had 87 départements. After 
WWI, the number increased to 90 because territories from Alsace-Lorraine lost in the 1870s were recovered.    9
might be under-represented, and foreign males who came to France after 1832 are not included in the 
sample.
14  
We obtain access to data from marriage certificates in two periods around WWI: 1909-1914 
and 1918-1928. These data contain information on the year and département of marriage, ages and 
occupations of both spouses, occupations of their parents, and whether their parents were still alive.
15 
In addition, we know whether the marriage took place in a rural area. We have observations on 1,688 
marriages before the war and 4,509 after it. 
 
3.2. The French censuses and Vital Statistics 
The French census data for the years 1906, 1911 and 1921 are available from Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (2007). The 1926 census data are available from archives 
at the library of the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). We use the 1911 
and 1921 censuses to construct département-level variables on marital status such as percentage of 
men/women single, divorced and widowed. We use the Vital Statistics for France to obtain the 
departement-level percentage of out-of-wedlock births for 1911 and 1921.  
We also link the year and département of each marriage in the TRA data set to département-
level information available from the censuses. In particular, we construct for 1911, 1921, and 1926 the 
sex ratio in each département, which we define as the ratio of the number of males aged 18 to 59 to the 
number of females aged 15 to 49, the age groups defined by the French census as marriageable age. 
The average sex ratio was 1.12 in 1911 and 1.02 in 1921, when it ranged from 0.86 to 1.23.  
   
3.3. The military mortality data 
Huber (1931) provides the proportion of soldiers reported dead and missing by the military 
region in which they were enlisted. During WWI, continental France was separated into 22 military 
regions (Boulanger, 2001). We link marriages to regional mortality data based on the départements in 
which the marriages occurred. For départements that fall entirely within a military region (78 
départements), we allocate the mortality rate of their military region. For each département that falls 
into more than one military region (9 départements), we allocate a weighted average of the mortality 
                                                 
14 Nobles may sometimes be classified under the letter D (because they are called “de Tra” rather than “Tra”). Some nobles 
might thus have escaped the original design. In addition, while the proportion of farmers is correct when considering the 
period over which the overall TRA data set was collected (i.e. 1803-1986), farmers seem to be over-represented in the 
resulting sample for the period 1970-1986. This may raise some selectivity issues. To deal with this, the descendants of 
3,000 additional “TRA” couples who married between 1803 and 1832 have been followed. The sample we use is based on 
the data set constructed with all of the 6,000 TRA families (source: email conversation with Jean-Pierre Pélissier).   
15 Occupations are missing for about 5% of the grooms and 12% of the brides, and for over 40% of their parents.    10
rates of the military regions into which it falls. We use as weights the proportions of the 1911 
population of the département in each of its constituent military regions. Military mortality therefore 
varies at the département level. 
Figure 1 shows the geographical variation in military mortality rate. This mortality rate ranges 
from 10.5% in Seine-et-Oise to 20.2%% in Seine-et-Marne. The mean mortality rate computed over 
the 87 départements is 16.8%; the median is 17.5%. Départements marked in darker red have higher 
mortality rates. Départements marked in full white correspond to a mortality rate of 11.9% or lower 
and départements marked in the darkest red correspond to a mortality rate of 19.6% or higher. 
Several factors contribute to the regional heterogeneity in military mortality rate. In addition to 
the natural randomness associated with war casualties, during the first two years of the war men 
residing in the same military region were typically sent to the same war zone.
  This was because 
soldiers either served in their military regions of residence, or were sent together to the battlefront to 
complement the troops of the northeastern regions where most of the fighting was taking place 
(Boulanger, 2001; Maurin, 1992).
16 The heterogeneity in military mortality during these years may 
thus be explained by the fact that men from different départements participated in battles of different 
violence levels. Military mortality in 1914 and 1915 constitutes about 49 percent of the total military 
deaths during WWI: 23 percent of the overall war casualties occurred in 1914, and 26 percent in 1915 
(Becker, 1999).  From 1916, men from different military regions were more mixed together at the 
battlefront, but the mixing was imperfect and some regional differences in mortality persisted.  
 
4. The impact of male scarcity on marital status and out-of-wedlock births 
A direct consequence of the unbalanced sex ratio following the war was that many women 
remained single in the post-war period. Figure 3 emphasizes the large increase in female celibacy rates 
as measured by the percentage of singles at age 50 by birth cohort. It also shows a large decrease in 
male celibacy rates for men in cohorts affected by the war, suggesting that some men who would 
otherwise have remained single got married.  
We now use regional heterogeneity in mortality to analyze in more detail the impact of military 
mortality on marital status three years after the war. We use departement-level data from the 1911 and 
1921 censuses and apply a difference-in-differences approach. Specifically, we estimate: 
 
, dt d t d t dt YP W M P W δ λα ε =+ + × +        (1) 
                                                 
16 For example, soldiers from Bretagne were sent to the Parisian region, while soldiers from the Parisian region went further 
east.    11
where  dt Y  is the percentage of men (or women) of a particular marital status (single, divorced or 
widowed) in département d at time t,  d δ  is a département dummy that captures time-invariant 
département-level factors such as local traditions related to marriage,  t PW  is a post-war dummy that 
equals one if the observation  dt Y  comes from the 1921 census and zero otherwise, and  d M is the 
military mortality rate in département d. The coefficient on  dt M PW ×  is therefore the coefficient of 
interest. Table 2 presents the estimates of the coefficients on  dt M PW ×  by gender and age group.  
The results indicate that more women remained single post war in départements with higher 
mortality rates, and that this effect was larger for women less than 29 years old. In départements where 
the military mortality was 20% instead of 10%, the proportion of single women aged 20 to 29 was 2.7 
percentage points higher post war (relative to a pre-war average of 39.4%). Among men, we find that 
fewer of those aged 20-29 remained single in départements with higher mortality post war.
17 These 
findings suggest that when men are in relative shortage, they are more likely to marry.  
At the same time, mortality seems to have had a negative impact on divorce rates. Specifically, 
Table 2 shows that the proportion of divorcés among both men aged 20-39 and women aged 20-39 
declined post war in départements with higher mortality. For instance, in the 30-39 age group, the 
proportion of divorcés of either gender declined post war by 0.13 percentage points in a département 
with 20% mortality relative to in one with 10% mortality (relative to a pre-war average of 0.5% for 
men and 0.7% for women). This finding seems to stand in contrast to South and Trent (1988), who 
found the sex ratio to be negatively correlated with the divorce rate for a large sample of developed 
and developing nations, and to Guttentag and Secord (1983), who argue that in societies with a low sex 
ratio men are less committed to existing marital relationships and more apt to divorce when they do 
marry. Our results may be partly due to the fact that some of the marriages that would have ended in 
divorce were more likely to be dissolved by the death of the husband in places with higher mortality. 
Another explanation may be that, despite their better position, men may have been less likely to ask for 
a divorce after the hardship of the war, especially in places where mortality was high. 
Finally, as expected, we find a large negative impact of military mortality on the proportion of 
widowed women. The effect is the largest for women aged 30-39: in départements where the military 
mortality was 20% instead of 10%, the proportion of widowed women aged 20 to 29 was 2.5 
percentage points higher post war (relative to a pre-war average of 1.0%). 
                                                 
17 Curiously, there was an increase in the proportion of single males aged 40-49 in regions with high mortality post war.    12
Another adjustment in the marriage market that has been proposed in the literature as a 
response to an imbalance in the sex ratio is the emergence of polygamy and relationships leading to 
out-of-wedlock births (Becker 1974, 1981, Bergstrom 1994, Willis 1999, Neal 2004). We next 
investigate the impact of male scarcity on out-of-wedlock births in France after the first WWI. We 
estimate a specification similar to equation (1) where the dependent variable is the département-level 
percentage of births that were out-of-wedlock from the Vital Statistics for the years 1911 and 1921. 
The coefficient on mortality interacted with post-war is 0.148 and statistically significant at the 1% 
level (regression not presented). This implies that the proportion of births that were out-of-wedlock 
was 1.5 percentage points higher (relative to a pre-war average of 6.7%) post war in a département 
with mortality of 20% than in one with mortality of 10%. Out-of-wedlock births may be an indicator of 
polygamy or a sign that men were able to have children without having to invest in them.  
 
5. The impact of male scarcity on assortative matching by social class 
A robust prediction of marriage models is that the position of men in the marriage market 
improves with a reduction in the ratio of men to women in the population. For example, in Becker's 
(1973, 1974 and 1981) frictionless model of the marriage market, an increase in men’s scarcity leads 
the average man to appropriate more of the surplus generated by his marriage. More recently, 
Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2001) presented a model of household bargaining and the distribution 
of resources inside the family. In their model, a reduction in the sex ratio increases men's bargaining 
power both within the household and in the marriage market.
18 Burdett and Coles (1997) and Bloch 
and Ryder (2000) consider a marriage market with search frictions and heterogeneous agents. In their 
set-up, there is assortative matching by class endogenously defined in the marriage market. A 
reduction in the male population implies that men of a given class marry women of higher classes than 
they did before the decrease in the male population.  
In this section, we use our marriage-level data to evaluate whether men were able to marry 
better in places with more male scarcity following WWI. We first describe how we allocate individuals 
into social classes. Then we test whether there was assortative matching by social class before the war. 
Finally, we use difference-in-differences and instrumental variables approaches to evaluate the impact 
of male scarcity on assortative matching by social class. 
 
                                                 
18 Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela (2009) is another recent theoretical paper that discusses the effect of the sex ratio on 
assortative matching. Iyigun and Walsh (2007) provide a model in which an asymmetry in the sex ratio in the marriage 
market produces gender differences in premarital investments and consumption.    13
5.1. Assigning social classes based on the Historical International Social Class Scheme 
We use the marriage certificate data on the specific occupations of the bride and groom (or 
their parents) to allocate each to a social class. To do this, we first match each of over a thousand 
occupations present in our data set to a 5-digit code from the Historical International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (HISCO) using a mapping available on the History of Work Information 
System website (http://historyofwork.iisg.nl/).  
HISCO is a detailed coding system, containing about 1,600 distinct occupations, designed to 
facilitate the comparison of historical international data. It is based on the 1968 International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO68), and customized for historical data (van Leeuwen et al., 2002). 
HISCO allocates each occupation to one of 7 sectors: (1) Professional, (2) Technical and Related 
Workers Administrative and Managerial Workers, (3) Clerical and Related Workers, (4) Sales 
Workers, (5) Service Workers, (6) Agricultural, Animal Husbandry and Forest Workers, Fishermen 
and Hunters and (7) Production and Related Workers, Transport Equipment Operators and Laborers. 
Each of these sectors is itself divided into smaller sub-sectors. For example, codes of the type 6-xx.xx 
correspond to the agricultural sector. Codes of the type 6-2x.xx refer to agricultural workers. This last 
group includes codes of the type 6-22.xx for field crop and vegetable farm workers and these, in turn, 
contain more specific occupational categories such as wheat farm workers (coded as 6-22.30) (van 
Leeuwen and Maas, 2005a).  
To map occupational codes into social classes, we use the Historical International Social Class 
Scheme (HISCLASS) developed by van Leeuwen and Maas (2005a). The HISCLASS system is ideal 
for our purposes because it allocates each of the 1,600 HISCO occupations into one of 12 social 
classes, where a “social class” is defined by van Leeuwen and Maas (2005a) as “a set of persons with 
the same life chances.” The mapping of occupations into social classes takes into account various 
dimensions of social status including whether the occupation is manual, the skill level required to 
perform it, and the degree to which the occupation involves supervision of others. This mapping is the 
result of a combination of the views of expert historians and the classifications given in the 1965 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT).  Expert historians were independently asked to classify 
HISCO occupations into social classes; DOT classifications are based on observations in plants and 
businesses that assign grades along these dimensions to over 10,000 occupation categories in US. In 
cases where the DOT and the experts disagreed, the experts’ opinions were taken. To increase the 
sample size in each class, in this paper we use the version of HISCLASS condensed into the following 
7 social classes (class 1 being the highest, and class 7 being the lowest):  
Class 1: Higher managers and professionals    14
Class 2: Lower managers and professionals, clerical and sales personnel 
Class 3: Foremen and skilled workers 
Class 4: Farmers and fishermen 
Class 5: Lower-skilled workers 
Class 6: Unskilled workers 
Class 7: Lower-skilled and unskilled farm workers 
This 7-class classification has been used in other works, and in particular in works using the 
TRA data set, to study social mobility and endogamy (Pélissier et al., 2005, Holt, 2005, Bull, 2005, 
Schumacher and Lorenzetti, 2005, Arrizabalaga, 2005, Lanzinger, 2005, Dribe and Lundh, 2005, Van 
de Putte et al., 2005, Bras and Kok, 2005, van Leeuwen and Maas, 2005b, 2005c). Appendix Table A3 
provides examples of occupations for each of the classes for men and women. 
We allocate individuals into classes based on their own occupations. One concern is that 34% 
of the brides in our data set do not have occupations, and therefore are excluded from our analysis 
based on own occupation. Another potential concern with using occupations as a measure of social 
class to compare assortative matching by class before and after the war is that the war may have 
induced individuals to change their occupations such that they would be allocated to different classes 
after the war. However, as discussed in Section 2.3, female labor force participation and occupations 
changed very little after the war compared with pre-war. Among men, mortality seemed similar across 
occupations. Finally, a third potential issue is that male scarcity may have changed the average age at 
which women married (see Section 6), which in turn may affect occupation at marriage. However, 
brides post war married on average less than a month older than their pre-war counterparts and only 10 
months older post war in départements with 10 percentage point higher mortality, which is unlikely to 
significantly affect their social classes as measured by occupations. In any case, we control for the ages 
of brides and grooms in our regressions, which allows us to capture the effect of the sex ratio on social 
class that goes beyond its effect on age.  
We additionally use two other approaches to allocate brides and grooms into classes. The first 
is to allocate brides and grooms to classes using the occupations of their fathers. This approach avoids 
the drawbacks of using own occupation, but fathers’ occupations are missing from our data for 43.4% 
of brides’ fathers and 47.7% of grooms’ fathers, and may not be missing at random (e.g., fathers from 
lower social class may die younger). Moreover, class based on own occupation and class based on 
father’s occupation measure different aspects of class if individuals value their spouse’s class and their 
spouse’s father’s class differently. Finally, because of intergenerational mobility, the classes, or “life 
chances”, of fathers are an imperfect measure of those of their children. Indeed, the pre-war correlation    15
between class based on father’s occupation and class based on own occupation is only 0.44 for grooms 
and 0.30 for brides.  
Our second alternative approach “predicts” brides’ classes using the pre-war relationship 
between the occupation-based classes of the brides and background characteristics that may affect their 
life chances, such as the classes of their parents and whether they live in a rural area. We predict the 
classes of the grooms similarly (see Appendix Table A4 for the imputation regressions).
19 This method 
is not affected by changes in average age at marriage or changes in occupations driven by war 
mortality, and allows us to use marriages where the bride has no occupation or where the father’s 
occupation is missing.
20 This imputation procedure, however, has two main drawbacks: it may 
introduce measurement error in our dependent variables, and it relies on the assumption that the 
relationship between our predictors and the class of the bride is the same for brides with and without 
occupations. 
 In Appendix Table A1, we present the distribution of brides and grooms when classified into 
the 7 classes based on their own occupations and on those of their fathers.  
 
5.2. Pre-war assortative matching by social class 
Before analyzing the impact of military mortality on assortative matching by social class, we 
study how strong matching by class was before the war. Specifically, we use pre-war data to test 
whether people marry those of similar class as opposed to randomly. We do so by examining the 
distribution of social distance, defined as the class of the bride minus the class of the groom, among 
pre-war marriages. When people marry within class, the social distance is zero.  
To implement this test, we compare the realized distribution of social distance with the 
distribution we would expect under the null hypothesis that pre-war grooms married randomly. Using a 
bootstrapping method, we construct 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for the distribution of social 
distance under the null hypothesis of random matching. Specifically, denote the number of pre-war 
marriages in our sample by N.  From the distribution of groom classes, we draw N grooms randomly 
with replacement; from the distribution of bride classes we draw N brides randomly with replacement.  
                                                 
19 In practice, we apply the following procedure. First, we regress bride class on: father’s class dummies including dummies 
for fathers’ class is missing for various reasons; mother’s class dummies including dummies for mother’s class is missing 
for various reasons; rural; interaction of rural with the father’s class and mother’s class dummies; city size dummies. 
Denote the predicted values brˆ  i de. We do the same to predict groom’s class. Denote the predicted values grˆ  o  om. Second, 
we define our dependent variables (see Section 5.3) using brˆ  i de and grˆ  o  om for all brides and all grooms (including those 
with and without occupations). 
20 If parents’ classes are not missing at random, a missing parent’s class may contain some information on the life chances 
of the child. We therefore include a dummy for a parent’s class being missing and avoid the necessity to drop such 
observations.    16
We match the list of grooms with the list of brides, and derive the distribution of social distances for 
this simulated set of marriages. We repeat this process 1000 times and construct the 95 percent 
confidence interval. The observed points in Figure 4 show the actual distribution of pre-war social 
distance for the marriages in our sample. Panel A presents social distance based on own class; Panel B 
presents social distance based on father’s class. In both cases, the observed distribution lies on the 
border of or outside the confidence interval for most social distances. In the case of own class, for 
instance, for brides and grooms of the same class, the observed proportion is nearly twice as large as 
the upper boundary of the confidence interval.  For the other social distances between -4 and +4, the 
observed proportions lie close to or below the lower bounds of the confidence intervals.  For the 
extreme social distances, the observed proportions are approximately zero. 
Overall, the figure clearly rejects the null hypothesis of random matching for classes based on 
own or father’s occupation. Grooms in the pre-war period were much more likely to marry brides of 
their own social class than chance would dictate, and were much less likely to marry brides who were 
socially distant from them. Note that 44% (45%) of men married women of the same social class 
defined using own (father’s) occupation, and 69% (70%) of men married a spouse whose social class 
was within one class away.
21 
 
5.3. Male scarcity and assortative matching by social class 
In this section, we test the hypothesis that men married better post war, i.e., married on average 
women of higher social classes compared with pre-war, in départements with higher mortality. We 
estimate difference-in-differences regressions where military mortality is the “treatment.” Specifically, 
we estimate: 
 
, idt d t d t idt idt YP W M P W Z δ λα γ ε =+ + × + +        (2) 
 
where i is a marriage, d is a département, and t is the year of the wedding. We use three alternative 
dependent variables Y: (1) the difference between the class of the bride and the class of the groom (a 
lower value means the man married up more); (2) a dummy for whether the groom married a bride of 
                                                 
21 There are at least two reasons why perfect assortative matching by social class may not occur even in environments 
where social class is important for marriage decision. The first is that the distribution of classes may be different across 
genders. For example, if there are many more men than women in class 1, then all the excess males in class 1 either remain 
single or they will marry women from other classes. Second, even if the distribution of classes is similar across gender, 
there are other characteristics, such as physical attractiveness or personality, that affect the marriage decision and that are 
not captured by social class.    17
lower class than his (married down); and (3) a dummy for whether a groom married a low-class bride 
(defined as being a bride of class 5, 6 or 7).
22 
23 
As before,  d δ  is a département dummy that captures time-invariant département-level factors 
such as local traditions related to marriage and class distribution,  t PW  is a post-war dummy variable 
that equals one if the wedding took place after the war and zero otherwise,  d M is the mortality rate due 
to the war in military département d, and  idt Z  are individual-level controls such as groom class 
dummies, age and whether the marriage took place in a rural area.
24 We cluster standard errors at the 
département level.  
Table 3 shows the estimation results of equation (2) when we use own occupation to allocate 
individuals into classes. The regressions suggest that, compared with pre-war, men were more likely to 
marry better after the war in regions with higher mortality rates; the coefficients on mortality interacted 
with the post-war dummy are negative and statistically significant at conventional levels in all the 
specifications. For example, in the regressions predicting whether the groom married down (column 2), 
the coefficient on military mortality interacted with the post-war dummy is -0.010. This magnitude can 
be interpreted as follows. Consider two regions that were identical pre war, but one of which had 20% 
mortality, and the other of which had only 10% mortality. Then post war the probability that a given 
groom married down would be 10 percentage points lower in the high mortality region than in the low 
mortality region (relative to a pre-war average of marrying down equal to 36.1%). Similarly, the 
coefficient in the regression predicting whether the groom married a low bride class (column 3) is -
0.017, suggesting that in départements where the military mortality was 20%, the probability that a 
given groom married a low class bride post war decreased by 17 percentage points compared with 
départements with 10% military mortality rates.
25 
                                                 
22 Note that our regressions include only men who actually married, so we face a sample selection issue. Although this 
means we are unable to test the model’s prediction that low class women will be more likely to remain single when men are 
scarcer, it does not affect our testing of the prediction that men will marry up more when men are scarcer. 
23 Appendix Table A2 presents the pre and post-war marriage matrices of brides and grooms from each social class. 
24 The groom’s age is used as stated on the marriage certificate if it falls within the range 10-89. Otherwise it is constructed 
as the difference between the year of marriage and date of birth if this falls in the same range. If neither age nor date of 
birth yields a sensible age, groom’s age is taken as missing. Bride’s age is constructed similarly. The dummy for rural is 
defined at the marriage level according to the administrative status of the place of marriage, which may take the values chef 
lieu de département, chef lieu d’arrondissement, chef-lieu de canton and rural. We consider the category rural to indicate a 
rural marriage, and the other three categories to indicate urban marriages. 
25 The estimations do not take into account the proportion of injured by military regions, since no such data are available. A 
potential concern is that men who were severely injured might have had poorer marriage opportunities, which may affect 
our results. After the war, 920,000 of the survivors were eligible to receive a pension from the state because of their 
disability (Corvisier, 1992). As a simple exercise, consider the limit case in which all those receiving a pension were unable 
to get married. Military mortality totaled 1,227,796 men, so the sum of mortality plus injured is 2,147,796.  Treating all    18
Panel A of Figure 4 shows that in the pre-war period the most common marriages were those 
within the same class or those where the bride was one class lower than the groom. To better 
understand the changes in patterns of assortative matching, we also investigated an alternative 
dependent variable that tested whether men were more likely to marry strictly above their own class in 
places with higher mortality (marry “strictly up”). We found the coefficient to be very small and 
imprecisely estimated. This suggests that men’s higher likelihood of marrying better post war in 
départements with high mortality occurred mainly through men being less likely to marry strictly down 
(and less likely to marry a low class bride) rather than through men being more likely to marry strictly 
up.
26 
We expect the impact of male scarcity on men’s ability to marry better (in terms of social class) 
after the war to be higher on average for middle and low-class men than for men from the highest 
social classes. This is because men from higher social classes were already marrying on average 
women of high classes, leaving less room for improvement. Performing the same regressions as (1) but 
excluding men of classes 1 and 2, we find (columns 4-6 of Table 3) that indeed the coefficients are 
larger in magnitude than those based on the full sample. 
In columns 1-3 of Table 4, we present the main results when we define class based on father’s 
occupation. The coefficients of mortality interacted with the post-war dummy are small and 
insignificant. This could be a result of the small sample size due to occupation being missing for many 
fathers. However, it could also be that individuals may value their spouse’s class and their spouse 
father’s class differently. In this sense, it may be that father’s-occupation-based class is a much less 
important margin of adjustment in the marriage market than own-occupation-based class following a 
decrease in the male population.  Columns 4-6 of Table 4 shows the results with imputed classes, 
where we use pre-war data to impute brides’ and grooms’ classes based on their parents’ occupations, 
whether parents’ occupations are missing, and other background information.
27 The coefficients of 
interest are negative and are precisely estimated (though smaller in magnitude than those of Table 3) 
when the dependent variables are class difference and marrying down, which suggests again that men 
married better after the war in départements with higher mortality rates.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
these men as military deaths implies we should scale our coefficients by (1,227,796 / 2,147,796), which is equal to 0.57.  
Hence, under this extreme assumption, the coefficients would decrease in magnitude by 43%. 
26 We also ran the regressions separately for rural and urban samples; the results were not significantly different in rural and 
urban areas. 
27 Note here a groom is considered to marry down if the bride’s class is lower than 0.5 worse than the groom’s class, and 
brides are defined as “low class” if their imputed class is 4.2 or worse. This cutoff yields approximately the same 
proportion of low class brides as the cutoff of 5 when classes are defined using own occupation.    19
We now test the effect of the sex ratio on assortative matching by class directly by 
instrumenting the potentially endogenous département-level sex ratio with département military 
mortality rates. As pointed out in the literature (e.g., Angrist, 2002, Kerwin and Luoh, 2005), the 
analysis of the impact of the sex ratio on the marriage market may suffer from omitted variable bias 
and possibly reverse causality. For example, a low sex ratio may indicate strong male out-migration. If 
migrants are selected positively or negatively according to unobservable variables that are relevant for 
marriage outcomes (e.g., groom’s ability or health), the random error term in a simple OLS regression 
of marriage outcomes on the sex ratio may be correlated with the sex ratio.
28  
In our context, we use military mortality as an instrument for the sex ratio because it exhibits 
exogenous geographical variation that affects the sex ratio, under the assumption that mortality does 
not have a direct effect on marriage by social class.
29  
In the first stage, we regress the sex ratio on military mortality interacted with post war and on 
the same controls used in the second stage. The second stage of our IV specification is: 
 
, idt d t td idt idt YP W S R Z δ λαγ ε =+ + + +    (3) 
 
where i is a marriage, d is a département, and t is the year of the wedding. The dependent variable Y is 
defined as before. The independent variable of interest is the département-level sex ratio td SR , which is 
instrumented with military mortality interacted with post war.
30 We cluster the standard errors at the 
département level.  
                                                 
28 Take for example the case of health as an omitted variable that is correlated with the sex ratio because of migration. We 
expect good health to improve the groom’s position in the marriage market. The direction of the omitted variable bias thus 
depends on the sign of the covariance between the sex ratio and good health. In the regressions using the difference 
between the class of the bride and the class of the groom, we therefore expect a downward bias in the coefficient associated 
with the sex ratio if migrants are more likely to be in good health than non-migrants, and an upward bias if migrants are 
more likely to be in poor health. 
29 While we cannot test this exclusion restriction, Appendix Table A5 suggests that mortality is not correlated with pre-war 
marriage by social class for own or father’s class. As an additional test, we use pre-war data to estimate difference-in-
differences “placebo” regressions, in which we falsely assume that the war took place between 1911 and 1912. We expect 
this placebo treatment to have no effect on marriage patterns. The coefficients associated with mortality rate interacted with 
the post-1911 dummy are statistically indistinguishable from zero in the specifications using own or father’s class (one 
exception is for low class bride when we use own class where the coefficient is statistically significant at 10%). This 
suggests that the results presented in Table 3 are not driven by changes in marriage patterns that occurred before the war. 
However, note that Table A5 suggests that mortality itself is significant in the results where classes are assigned based on 
imputations; we thus do not present IV results for those.  
30 The sex ratio is not measured at the time of the wedding, but rather at the census year closest to the wedding. Marriages 
in the period 1909 to 1914 use the 1911 sex ratio, marriages in the period 1918 to 1923 use the 1921 sex ratio, and 
marriages in the period 1924 to 1928 use the 1926 sex ratio.    20
Columns 1 to 3 of Table 6 show the results when we use own occupation to allocate individuals 
into classes. The results suggest that men were more likely to marry women of better social classes 
after the war in départements with lower sex ratios.
31 The coefficient associated with the instrumented 
sex ratio is statistically significant at conventional levels for all the dependent variables. The IV 
regression predicting class difference (column 1) suggests that a decrease in the sex ratio from 10 men 
for every 10 women to 9 men for every 10 women would improve the expected class of bride married 
by a given groom by 0.42 from an average class difference of 0.21. The coefficients of columns 2 and 
3 imply that a decrease in the sex ratio from 10 men for every 10 women to 9 men for every 10 women 
would decrease the probability a given groom married down by 20 percentage points and decrease the 
probability of marrying a low class bride by 35 percentage points. We run similar regressions when 
classes are allocated based on father’s occupation (columns 3 to 6 of Table 6). As in the difference-in-
differences specifications, the coefficients associated with the sex ratio are small and imprecisely 
estimated when we use father’s occupation.   
In Appendix Table A6 we present the results of equation (3) estimated by OLS. The coefficient 
associated with the sex ratio has the right sign but is much smaller in magnitude than in the IV 
estimation. This could suggest that endogeneity of the sex ratio is important. The difference between 
the IV and the OLS estimates is consistent with migrants being positively selected (e.g., healthier men 
being more likely to migrate). 
Overall, our results show that the increase in male scarcity in post-WWI France enabled men to 
improve their position in the marriage market and marry women from higher social classes when 
compared with pre-war standards. Although our results do not allow us to fully understand the precise 
mechanisms behind this social ascension of men, they are consistent with the idea that, on average, 
men prefer women of higher class, i.e. that men have vertical preferences. Thus, one possible 
explanation for the assortative matching by social class that we observe at the beginning of the 20
th 
century in France is that, although men preferred to marry higher class women, in equilibrium they 
were unable to do so. Note, however, that men marrying up as a result of male scarcity is also 
consistent with horizontal preferences for social class, provided that the distribution of classes across 
gender is sufficiently different and individuals prefer to marry up rather than down when marrying 
horizontally is not possible.  
 
                                                 
31 Our results are robust to using a sex ratio defined as the ratio of the number of males aged 15 to 49 to the number of 
females aged 15 to 49, and the ratio of the number of males aged 15 to 39 to the number of females aged 15 to 39, though 
the coefficient of the instrumented sex ratio is less precisely estimated for class difference in the latter case.    21
6. The impact of male scarcity on spousal age gap and age at marriage 
We next analyze the effects of military mortality on assortative matching by age, namely the 
spousal age gap and age at marriage. To identify the effect of the war above and beyond its effect on 
class, we control for the classes of the bride and the groom, just as we control for the ages of the bride 
and groom in our analysis of the effect of the war on social class. We focus on first marriages (84% of 
our observations) and follow the same difference-in-differences empirical strategy as in Section 5.3. 
We estimate a regression similar to (2) where the dependent variables are (i) the difference between the 
age of the bride and the age of the groom, (ii) the age of the groom, and (iii) the age of the bride.  
Before the war, the average groom was 3.8 years older than his bride, 33% of the grooms 
married brides who were 0 to 3 years younger than themselves, and the average age of brides at first 
marriage was 23.9. Table 7 shows the impact of male scarcity on the age gap and age at marriage. In 
column 1, the coefficient associated with mortality interacted with post-war is positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that the age gap between brides and grooms narrowed in regions with higher 
mortality post war. To illustrate the magnitude of this effect, consider two regions where grooms were 
the same amount older than their brides on average pre war. Suppose one region suffered 10% 
mortality, and the other suffered 20% mortality. Then, ceteris paribus, post war the average age gap 
between brides and their grooms would be 11 months narrower in the high mortality region than in the 
low mortality region. Columns 2 and 3 show no significant differences in the average age of grooms 
post war in regions of different mortality rates, but an increase in the average age of brides in regions 
with higher mortality. For example, brides married 10 months later in départements with 10 percentage 
point higher mortality rates. Overall, these results show that in départements with higher mortality 
rates the age gap between the groom and the bride decreased relative to in low-mortality départements 
because women tended to marry at an older age, while men did not delay their marriages.
32  
The fact that women married at an older age in départements with higher mortality is consistent 
with several plausible explanations. It may have taken more time for women to find a match due to 
male scarcity, so they ended up getting married at a later age. Alternatively, it could be that men 
preferred to marry slightly older women than they married before the war and were able to do so after 
the war.  
                                                 
32 We also again ran specifications where we use mortality  d M  alone instead of département dummies (results not shown). 
The coefficients of interest, the ones associated with mortality interacted with post-war, are essentially unchanged in these 
specification. However, we note that mortality itself is statistically significant (and negative), suggesting a correlation 
between mortality and pre-war age gap. One possible explanation is that younger men were more likely to be drafted and 
that therefore mortality was higher in départements with a younger age structure. The main specifications with department 
dummies absorb such differences across départements. 
    22
 
7. Conclusions 
A robust prediction of marriage models is that the position of men (women) in the marriage 
market improves (worsens) with a reduction in the ratio of men to women in the population. This paper 
uses an exogenous negative shock to the male population generated by WWI mortality in France to 
analyze empirically the impact of male scarcity on several outcomes of the marriage market. Overall, 
we find that the decrease in the proportion of men in the population due to war-related mortality 
increased the proportion of men who married and allowed them to marry women of higher social class. 
Men experienced “social ascension”, marrying women from classes that would have been inaccessible 
before the war. We find that post war in regions with higher mortality, women were less likely to 
marry and they married at an older age, leading to a decrease in the age gap between brides and 
grooms. We also show that post war in regions more affected by military mortality, there were more 
out-of-wedlock births and fewer divorces. 
This paper illustrates a potential consequence of brutal wars such as WWI: the change in 
marriage patterns, along with an increase in social mobility and out-of-wedlock births. Despite the fact 
that these results were obtained in the specific context of post-WWI France, they may shed light on the 
consequences of current imbalances in the sex ratio (a relative scarcity of women) in South Asia.  
Finally, one may wonder whether the war induced a transitional or permanent change in social 
mobility and social integration. This question is left for future research. On this specific front, an 
obstacle to overcome is the occurrence of WWII, which may hinder the analysis of the long-term 
implications of WWI on social mobility. Another natural extension is to examine the effect of military 
mortality on marrying up in other countries that participated in WWI. Such a study could shed light on 
differences in social mobility across countries.    23
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This map shows the geographic variation in the percentage of soldiers killed.  Totally 
white corresponds to a mortality rate of 11.9%, the 10
th percentile; totally red corresponds 
to a mortality rate of 19.6%, the 90
th percentile.  
 
 
28Figure 2: Number of first marriages per 1,000 women by birth cohorts and years 
Source: Henry (1966) 
 
 
Figure 3: Percentage of singles at age 50 by birth cohort 
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29Figure 4: Pre-WWI matching was assortative 
Panel A: Class defined by own occupation 
 
Panel B: Class defined by father’s occupation 
 
Note: The null hypothesis is that grooms match randomly from the population of brides. 
30Table 1: Distribution across occupations 
Panel A: Distribution of fatalities by occupation at age 20 (in %) 
Occupation  % of fatalities 
Agriculture  41.5 
Industry/Alimentation/Construction/Transportation  35.7 
Sales  9.5 
Liberal professions  2.4 
Civil servant  1.3 
Domestic  4.2 
Clergy  0.2 
Without profession  0.5 
Others  4.6 
Total  100.0 
 
Panel B: Distribution of the labor force by occupation (in %) 
  1906  1921 
Occupation  males  females  males  females 
Fishing  0.6  0.1  0.6  0 
Agriculture and forestry  43.8  43.2  39.9  45.9 
Industry and transportation  37.9  32.7  41.8  28.7 
Sales  10.4  10.1  10.4  11.7 
Liberal professions  2.4  2.5  2.3  3.4 
Public service  3.5  1.3  4.2  2.3 
Domestic  1.4  10.1  0.8  8 
% of the pop. in the labor force  68.2  39.0  71.2  42.6 






31Table 2: The impact of male scarcity on marital status by age group and gender
Coefficient presented is on the interaction between post war and military mortality
Dependent variable: single males single females divorced males divorced females widowed males widowed females
age group: 15-19 0.010 0.109*
(0.006) (0.043)
20-29 -0.312*** 0.270** -0.004** -0.006 0.003 0.053*
(0.108) (0.095) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.030)
30-39 0.044 0.037 -0.013 -0.013* -0.001 0.245***
(0.084) (0.047) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.050)
40-49 0.119** 0.065** 0.003 -0.007 0.002 0.138***
(0.047) (0.033) (0.007) (0.006) (0.013) (0.032)
Notes: Coefficients are from OLS regressions run separately for each age group and gender. The dependent variable in each regression is 
the percentage of the gender in the given age group with the stated marital status, in either 1911 or 1921. All regressions include a post war 
dummy and departement dummies. The number of observations in each regression is 174. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
Asterisks denote significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
32Table 3: Impact of male scarcity on assortative matching by class (OLS)
Classes defined by own occupation
Dependent variable: class difference married down low class bride class difference married down low class bride
% of Soldiers Killed * Post War -0.020* -0.010** -0.017*** -0.035*** -0.017*** -0.023***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.004) (0.006)
Post War 0.196 0.092 0.223*** 0.491** 0.240*** 0.338***
(0.146) (0.065) (0.066) (0.187) (0.060) (0.082)
Rural 0.190** 0.032 -0.034 0.191** 0.032 -0.036
(0.085) (0.029) (0.030) (0.091) (0.029) (0.033)
Bride's Age (/100) -0.582 0.087 -0.095 -0.923* -0.164 -0.084
(0.473) (0.160) (0.142) (0.488) (0.185) (0.188)
Groom's Age (/100) 0.355 -0.166 0.134 0.430 0.033 0.048
(0.377) (0.138) (0.127) (0.364) (0.130) (0.151)
Groom Class Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Departement Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.387 0.271 0.232 0.357 0.240 0.261
Observations 3117 2994 3117 2432 2309 2432
Notes: The first three columns are for the full sample of grooms; the second three columns exclude grooms of classes 1 and 2.  The 
dependent variable in the first and fourth columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom (thus a greater class difference 
indicates the groom married a lower class of bride); the dependent variable in the second and fifth columns is a dummy variable for whether 
the groom married a bride of lower class than himself; the dependent variable in the third and sixth columns is a dummy for the bride being 
of low class (5, 6 or 7).  Classes are defined using own occupation.  Standard errors, clustered at the departement level, are presented in 
parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
All classes of groom Excluding grooms of class 1 and 2
33Table 4: Impact of male scarcity on assortative matching by class (OLS)
Alternative definitions of class
Dependent variable: class difference married down low class bride class difference married down low class bride
% of Soldiers Killed * Post War 0.009 -0.002 -0.005 -0.006** -0.006** -0.002
(0.016) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Post War -0.174 0.006 0.062 0.088*** 0.108*** 0.033
(0.239) (0.073) (0.080) (0.030) (0.035) (0.036)
Rural 0.153 0.016 -0.098*** 0.301*** 0.209*** 0.397***
(0.098) (0.030) (0.030) (0.023) (0.019) (0.026)
Bride's Age (/100) -2.458** -0.110 -0.580** 0.362 0.359** 0.096
(1.049) (0.223) (0.255) (0.286) (0.158) (0.117)
Groom's Age (/100) -0.331 -0.476* -0.514** 0.035 0.134 -0.023
(0.951) (0.268) (0.226) (0.115) (0.086) (0.091)
Groom Class Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Groom Half-Class Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Departement Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.355 0.282 0.218 0.461 0.244 0.433
Observations 1966 1882 1966 5832 5832 5832
Notes: All regressions are for the full sample of grooms. The first three columns define class by father's occupation; the second three 
columns impute class from background characteristics including parents' classes.  The dependent variable in the first and fourth columns is 
the class of the bride minus the class of the groom (thus a greater class difference indicates the groom married a lower class of bride); the 
dependent variable in the second and fifth columns is a dummy variable for whether the groom married a bride of lower class than himself; 
the dependent variable in the third and sixth columns is a dummy for the bride being of low class (5, 6 or 7).  Standard errors, clustered at 
the departement level, are presented in parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Classes defined by father's occupation Classes imputed using background characteristics
34Table 5: Impact of male scarcity on assortative matching by class (IV)
Panel A: Stage 2 regressions
Dependent variable: class difference married down low class bride class difference married down low class bride
Sex Ratio (men/women) 4.220* 2.022** 3.475*** -2.292 0.632 1.361
(2.157) (0.863) (1.017) (4.070) (1.166) (1.295)
Post War 0.245 0.116* 0.263*** -0.224 0.021 0.092
(0.160) (0.065) (0.071) (0.331) (0.094) (0.103)
Rural 0.197** 0.036 -0.028 0.152 0.016 -0.098***
(0.085) (0.030) (0.031) (0.093) (0.029) (0.030)
Bride's Age (/100) -0.497 0.126 -0.026 -2.523** -0.091 -0.542**
(0.450) (0.141) (0.149) (1.011) (0.225) (0.236)
Groom's Age (/100) 0.372 -0.156 0.149 -0.441 -0.447* -0.449*
(0.358) (0.131) (0.124) (0.957) (0.257) (0.242)
Groom Class Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Departement Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.383 0.263 0.214 0.353 0.283 0.215
Observations 3117 2994 3117 1966 1882 1966
Panel B: Stage 1 regressions
Dependent variable: Sex Ratio
% of Soldiers Killed * Post War -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Controls as in Stage 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.890 0.887 0.890 0.893 0.894 0.893
Class defined by own occupation Class defined by father's occupation
Notes: Panel A shows the second stage of the IV regressions, where marriage outcomes are regressed on the instrumented sex ratio and controls; Panel B shows the first 
stage, where the sex ratio is regressed on military mortality interacted with post war, and controls.
The first three columns define class by own occupation; the second three columns define class by father's occupation.  The dependent variable in the first and fourth 
columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom (thus a greater class difference indicates the groom married a lower class of bride); the dependent variable in 
the second and fifth columns is a dummy variable for whether the groom married a bride of lower class than himself; the dependent variable in the third and sixth columns 
is a dummy for the bride being of low class (5, 6 or 7). The sex ratio is defined as men aged 18-59 divided by women aged 15-49 in the departement and census period. 
Standard errors, clustered at the departement level, are presented in parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
35Table 6: Impact of male scarcity on assortative matching by age (OLS)
Dependent variable: age difference groom's age bride's age
% of Soldiers Killed * Post War 0.092** 0.019 0.083**
(0.036) (0.038) (0.038)
Post War -0.626 -0.931* -1.164*
(0.536) (0.519) (0.615)
Rural -0.325** 0.331 -0.340*
(0.125) (0.215) (0.184)
Groom Class Dummies Yes Yes No
Bride Class Dummies Yes No Yes
Departement Dummies Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.063 0.062 0.064
Observations 4868 5205 5287
Notes: The dependent variable in the first column is the age of the bride minus the age of the groom; the 
dependent variables in the second and third columns are the age of the groom and the age of the bride. 
Classes dummies include categories for no occupation and missing occupation/class. Standard errors, 
clustered at the departement level, are presented in parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance at: * 10%, 
36Table A1: Summary statistics
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Departement-level variables
Military mortality 16.8 2.6
Sex ratio 1.12 0.09 1.01 0.07
Marital status variables
% single males aged 15-19 99.8% 0.1% 99.5% 0.2%
% single males aged 20-29 68.4% 7.1% 62.8% 7.4%
% single males aged 30-39 19.7% 5.2% 20.5% 5.0%
% single males aged 40-49 12.0% 3.1% 11.9% 3.1%
% single females aged 15-19 93.3% 2.9% 94.3% 2.3%
% single females aged 20-29 39.4% 8.2% 45.5% 7.7%
% single females aged 30-39 14.6% 3.7% 15.7% 4.2%
% single females aged 40-49 11.3% 3.0% 11.5% 2.9%
% divorced males aged 20-29 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
% divorced males aged 30-39 0.5% 0.3% 0.7% 0.4%
% divorced males aged 40-49 0.7% 0.4% 0.9% 0.5%
% divorced females aged 20-29 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2%
% divorced females aged 30-39 0.7% 0.4% 0.9% 0.5%
% divorced females aged 40-49 0.7% 0.5% 0.9% 0.5%
% widowed males aged 20-29 0.3% 0.1% 0.3% 0.1%
% widowed males aged 30-39 1.7% 0.3% 1.7% 0.3%
% widowed males aged 40-49 4.1% 0.6% 4.0% 0.5%
% widowed females aged 20-29 1.0% 0.2% 2.7% 0.8%
% widowed females aged 30-39 4.1% 0.7% 9.9% 1.5%
% widowed females aged 40-49 10.8% 1.7% 11.6% 1.6%
% of births out-of-wedlock 6.7% 3.5% 7.4% 2.9%
Marriage-level variables
Classes defined by own occupation
Class difference 0.21 1.55 0.24 1.53
Married down 0.36 0.35
Low class bride 0.44 0.40
Classes defined by father's occupation
Class difference 0.07 1.69 0.04 1.59
Married down 0.31 0.29
Low class bride 0.26 0.27
Classes imputed from background characteristics
Class difference 0.36 0.60 0.35 0.57
Married down 0.78 0.79
Low class bride 0.42 0.41
Age variables
Age difference -3.8 4.9 -3.1 4.5
Bride's age 23.9 5.6 23.9 5.7
Groom's age 27.5 5.3 26.8 6.0
Class distribution
Brides Grooms Brides Grooms
Class defined by own occupation
1 1.1% 5.5% 2.0% 7.2%
2 9.6% 17.9% 17.6% 20.4%
3 30.6% 24.3% 22.3% 24.4%
4 14.9% 23.0% 17.7% 22.5%
5 33.3% 20.1% 30.6% 16.9%
6 6.4% 5.4% 6.9% 5.5%
7 4.1% 4.0% 3.0% 3.3%
Class defined by father's occupation
1 7.1% 8.7% 7.2% 7.5%
2 13.4% 13.5% 14.3% 13.8%
3 16.6% 14.2% 14.5% 17.0%
4 36.9% 39.5% 37.0% 36.6%
5 13.7% 12.7% 14.7% 13.6%
6 6.2% 6.8% 8.2% 7.3%
7 6.2% 4.6% 4.2% 4.2%
Notes: Post war values of the departement-level variables are for 1921. 
Pre war Post war
Pre war Post war
Appendix
37Table A2: Assortative matching by class
Panel A: Pre war
bride's class: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 total
groom's class:
1 3 8 6 0 5 0 0 22
13.6% 36.4% 27.3% 0.0% 22.7% 0.0% 0.0% 100%
2 2 36 60 4 45 6 2 155
1.3% 23.2% 38.7% 2.6% 29.0% 3.9% 1.3% 100%
3 3 28 112 7 69 13 3 235
1.3% 11.9% 47.7% 3.0% 29.4% 5.5% 1.3% 100%
4 0 2 19 122 57 1 9 210
0.0% 1.0% 9.1% 58.1% 27.1% 0.5% 4.3% 100%
5 1 13 72 7 99 21 9 222
0.5% 5.9% 32.4% 3.2% 44.6% 9.5% 4.1% 100%
6 1 3 9 2 24 18 1 58
1.7% 5.2% 15.5% 3.5% 41.4% 31.0% 1.7% 100%
7 0 1 8 2 17 2 16 46
0.0% 2.2% 17.4% 4.4% 37.0% 4.4% 34.8% 100%
total 10 91 286 144 316 61 40 948
1.1% 9.6% 30.2% 15.2% 33.3% 6.4% 4.2% 100%
Panel B: Post war
bride's class: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 total
groom's class:
1 16 38 11 2 14 3 0 84
19.1% 45.2% 13.1% 2.4% 16.7% 3.6% 0.0% 100%
2 10 185 125 13 98 10 5 446
2.2% 41.5% 28.0% 2.9% 22.0% 2.2% 1.1% 100%
3 12 101 197 29 183 51 7 580
2.1% 17.4% 34.0% 5.0% 31.6% 8.8% 1.2% 100%
4 1 14 46 330 116 4 12 523
0.2% 2.7% 8.8% 63.1% 22.2% 0.8% 2.3% 100%
5 5 48 96 22 208 32 13 424
1.2% 11.3% 22.6% 5.2% 49.1% 7.6% 3.1% 100%
6 1 11 22 5 49 53 5 146
0.7% 7.5% 15.1% 3.4% 33.6% 36.3% 3.4% 100%
7 0 1 9 14 28 4 27 83
0.0% 1.2% 10.8% 16.9% 33.7% 4.8% 32.5% 100%
total 45 398 506 415 696 157 69 2286
2.0% 17.4% 22.1% 18.2% 30.5% 6.9% 3.0% 100%
Notes: Classes are defined by own occupation. This table presents the number and percentage of grooms in each class pre and post 
war who married brides of each class.
38Table A3. Examples of common occupations within each class 
Class  Women  Men 
1  Accountant, professor  Accountant, engineer 
2  Store employee, bank employee  Railway company employee, store 
employee 
3  Seamstress, cook  Mechanic, constructor 
4  Farmer, winegrower  Farmer, winegrower 
5  Domestic, linen maid  Driver, domestic 
6  Factory worker, worker  Factory worker, worker 




















39Table A4: Class imputation regressions
Dependent variable: class defined by own occupation
coefficient standard error coefficient standard error
Father's Class Dummies
Class 1 -0.866* 0.478 -1.022*** 0.250
Class 2 -0.474* 0.252 -0.880*** 0.198
Class 3 -0.091 0.209 -0.378* 0.196
Class 4 0.108 0.239 0.132 0.211
Class 5 0.261 0.226 0.574*** 0.205
Class 6 0.314 0.236 0.226 0.240
Class 7 0.337 0.526 1.873*** 0.526
Father is Dead 0.095 0.176 -0.082 0.156
Father has no Occupation 0.388 0.467 -0.218 0.427
Mother's Class Dummies
Class 1 -0.615 0.592 0.022 0.338
Class 2 -0.890*** 0.287 -0.107 0.277
Class 3 -1.007*** 0.259 -0.048 0.362
Class 4 0.157 0.294 -0.066 0.245
Class 5 0.003 0.179 0.552*** 0.165
Class 6 0.303 0.258 0.534** 0.247
Class 7 -0.952 1.329 0.267 0.384
Mother is Dead 0.044 0.164 0.117 0.134
Mother has no Occupation -0.222 0.183 0.108 0.138
Rural 0.688** 0.308 0.860*** 0.236
Rural * Father's Class Dummies
Class 1 -0.162 0.705 -0.260 0.415
Class 2 -0.397 0.595 -0.331 0.394
Class 3 -0.400 0.397 -0.574* 0.338
Class 4 -0.215 0.358 -0.498* 0.289
Class 5 -0.366 0.400 0.180 0.347
Class 6 -0.383 0.795 -0.241 0.576
Class 7 -0.183 0.607 -1.290** 0.601
Father is Dead -0.274 0.317 -0.273 0.254
Father has no Occupation 0.547 0.813 -0.814 0.912
Rural * Mother's Class Dummies
Class 1 0.973 1.158 -0.954* 0.539
Class 2 0.625 0.625 -0.212 0.603
Class 3 1.041** 0.502 -0.111 0.550
Class 4 -0.516 0.371 0.088 0.299
Class 5 0.082 0.279 -0.489** 0.241
Class 6 0.511 0.541 -0.914 0.566
Class 7 1.687 1.368
Mother is Dead -0.213 0.279 -0.169 0.211
Mother has no Occupation -0.400 0.339 -0.549** 0.227
City Size Dummies
Paris -0.369** 0.147 -0.284** 0.118
Big City -0.089 0.195 -0.323** 0.153
Medium-Sized City 0.112 0.159 0.000 0.126
Observations
Notes: This table presents the OLS regressions used to impute the classes of the brides and grooms from background characteristics. 
Pre-war marriages only are used. The dependent variable in each case is class defined by own occupation. Asterisks denote 
significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
brides grooms
973 1,596
40Table A5: Impact of male scarcity on assortative matching by class (OLS, no regional fixed effects)
Dependent variable: class difference married down low class bride class difference married down low class bride class difference married down low class bride
% of Soldiers Killed * Post War -0.018* -0.007 -0.014*** 0.005 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006** -0.006** -0.003
(0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
% of Soldiers Killed 0.025 0.005 0.002 0.014 0.002 0.002 0.021** 0.013*** 0.016***
(0.018) (0.008) (0.010) (0.015) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005)
Post War 0.195 0.069 0.196*** -0.093 0.019 0.081 0.099*** 0.105*** 0.038
(0.152) (0.065) (0.073) (0.249) (0.071) (0.080) (0.030) (0.033) (0.036)
Rural 0.378*** 0.099*** 0.064 0.161* 0.020 -0.085*** 0.341*** 0.223*** 0.424***
(0.094) (0.037) (0.044) (0.090) (0.026) (0.030) (0.035) (0.025) (0.032)
Bride's Age (/100) -0.428 0.167 0.027 -2.366** -0.159 -0.544** 0.376 0.378** 0.113
(0.416) (0.149) (0.164) (0.953) (0.214) (0.235) (0.259) (0.144) (0.124)
Groom's Age (/100) 0.115 -0.246* -0.001 -0.587 -0.410 -0.622** -0.010 0.127 -0.042
(0.358) (0.133) (0.148) (0.910) (0.272) (0.238) (0.105) (0.085) (0.096)
Groom Class Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
Groom Half-Class Dummies No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.344 0.197 0.116 0.322 0.229 0.154 0.429 0.222 0.397
Observations 3117 2994 3117 1966 1882 1966 5832 5832 5832
Notes: Classes are defined by own occupation in the first three columns, by father's occupation in the second three columns, and are imputed from background characteristics including 
parents' classes in the last three columns. The dependent variable in the first of each set of three columns is the class of the bride minus the class of the groom (thus a greater class difference 
indicates the groom married a lower class of bride); the dependent variable in the second is a dummy variable for whether the groom married a bride of lower class than himself; the 
dependent variable in the third is a dummy for the bride being of low class (5, 6 or 7).  Standard errors, clustered at the departement level, are presented in parentheses.  Asterisks denote 
significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Class defined by own occupation Class imputed from background characteristics Class defined by father's occupation
41Table A6: Impact of male scarcity on assortative matching by class (OLS equivalent of IV)
Dependent variable: class difference married down low class bride class difference married down low class bride
Sex Ratio (males/females) 0.742 0.430 0.962***  0.411 0.534* 0.363
(0.842) (0.301) (0.322) (1.100) (0.292) (0.439)
Post War -0.040 -0.013 0.058 -0.004 0.011 0.008
(0.105) (0.032) (0.038) (0.100) (0.028) (0.040)
Rural 0.202** 0.041 -0.025 0.142 0.010 -0.094***
(0.084) (0.029) (0.030) (0.098) (0.029) (0.029)
Bride's Age (/100) -0.533 0.089 -0.084 -1.958** -0.007 -0.491**
(0.451) (0.154) (0.138) (0.942) (0.201) (0.221)
Groom's Age (/100) 0.229 -0.189 0.102 -0.602 -0.616** -0.536**
(0.364) (0.133) (0.127) (0.895) (0.274) (0.215)
Groom Class Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Groom Half-Class Dummies No No No No No No
Departement Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.388 0.271 0.227 0.361 0.286 0.218
Observations 3193 3066 3193 2103 2009 2103
Class defined by own occupation Class defined by father's occupation
Notes: This table presents results from equation (3) run as OLS regressions.  Classes are defined by own occupation in the first three 
columns, and by father's occupation in the second three columns. The dependent variable in the first of each set of three columns is the 
class of the bride minus the class of the groom (thus a greater class difference indicates the groom married a lower class of bride); the 
dependent variable in the second is a dummy variable for whether the groom married a bride of lower class than himself; the dependent 
variable in the third is a dummy for the bride being of low class (5, 6 or 7).  Standard errors, clustered at the departement level, are 
presented in parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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